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In Canada, there exists an epidemic of seafood fraud ad counteracting this requires an 
understanding of which actors are creating this issue. To do this, I created a model and used 
variables, including likelihood to be caught, the costs of being caught both in terms of 
reputational costs and fines levied by the government, to determine which stage of the supply 
chain has the greatest incentive. I found that various stages had some incentive however, the 
value-add and processing stage had the greatest benefit and lowest likelihood of being caught. 
I then put forward some policy suggestions, based off Europe’s success in addressing fraud, 
and adapted them to the Canadian situation. The literature and information in this area has 
proven there are ways of combatting seafood fraud in Canada and this paper hopes to over a 




2.1 Problem Statement 
In North America, there has been an epidemic of fraud that is costing consumers, according to 
some estimates, the same as the illicit drug industry (CBC, 2018). Seafood fraud, through 
mislabeling, is an economic epidemic. The actions of unscrupulous actors, which are an 
asymmetric advantage and their comprehension of a complex system, is resulting in fraudulent 
profits at the expense of consumers. Seafood fraud has continued to thrive in Canada while 
NGO campaigns, news stories and public outcry against the fraud are prevalent. To combat 
the epidemic, I delve into the issue and then offer solutions, based on a successful system used 
in European, which has driven mislabelling rates to the lowest globally.  
In 2016 Seafood exports from Canada accounted for over 6.5 billion CAD exchanged in 2016, 
while imports represented just under 3.8 billion CAD (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2017). 
Further, the 10 billion CAD which changes hands over seafood each year helps maintain 
72,000 jobs and represents 1.5% of total exports in Canada (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 
2017; Statistics Canada, 2018). Seafood, therefore, represents one of Canada’s most important 
industries, yet startlingly little is known about the origins and supply chain custody of the 
product received by Canadian consumers. Recent studies suggest that mislabelling rates range 
from 21% to as high as 77% in North American Seafood (Willette et al., 2017). Of the 1034 
samples tested across these studies spanning 9 years, 358 were mislabelled, for an average of 
41% of samples being fraudulently or incorrectly labelled (Willette et al., 2017) 1. Due to the 
complex nature of the seafood supply chain, tracing these mislabelled products back to the 
perpetrator is extremely difficult and costly. A systemic approach is need to address the stage 
mislabelling is most incentivized and to determine the firms involved. 
                                                
1 This figure was generated by averaging the rates across the study 
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2.2 Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to build on research and literature that has identified seafood 
mislabelling in the supply chain of North America and determine the stage in the supply chain 
mislabelling is most likely to occur. Only recently has there been enough evidence to identify 
the extent to which mislabelling is occurring in North America, and specifically Canada. I 
review how mislabelled seafood is currently addressed will be evaluated and potential 
solutions, from adapting the European model, will be offered. 
The paper will use an economic model to look at the various stages of the seafood supply chain 
and attempt to create an economic rationale for government to intervene and deal with 
mislabelling, without having to oversee all transactions at each stage of the supply chain. Due 
to the global interconnectedness of the seafood supply chain there are logistical issues in 
identifying what issues arise and where.  
This paper investigates the five stages of the supply chain: inputs and technology, 
harvester/producer to first production stage, first production stage to value add, value add to 
retail and lastly retail to consumer. For the purpose of this paper, there is no reason to test 
inputs and technology in the model, as I argue that they do not contribute to seafood fraud in 
the supply chain. 
Using the results and inferences from the model, I will be able to identify where mislabelling 
is most likely to occur. This allows the governing body could allocate resources most 
efficiently and effectively to reduce mislabelling. However, this is only one side of the 
problem. Since nearly one third of the domestic consumption of seafood, in monetary terms, 
is from imported products, there must be a solution for the imported products as well. Due to 
the global market for seafood I provide a potential solution, through adapting the areas that 
Europe used to minimize seafood fraud, to Canada. 
2.3 How Europe Solved Fraud 
The European Union previously had rates of mislabelling in seafood comparable to North 
America’s current rates. A study conducted in Ireland in 2010 showed rates of Cod and 
Haddock mislabelling at 25% (Miller and Mariani, 2010). When testing smoked products, the 
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authors found mislabelling rates of 82.4% (Miller and Mariani, 2010). Since the release of that 
study, the EU government has implemented strict regulations on product labelling and created 
a government program LABELFISH, which is the Atlantic Network on Genetic Control of 
Fish and Seafood Labelling and Traceability (Labelfish). These programs successfully 
decreased mislabelling rates in Western Europe to less than 10% for all Western European 
countries (ranging from 2.7% to 8.9%). (Mariani et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 1.1: Seafood Mislabelling rates in Western Europe (Mariani et al. 2015) 
These successes have been attained in various methods, which will be explored later in the 
paper. For Canada to succeed it will have to deal with the mislabelling problem in a similar 
manner to the EU.  
2.4 Canada’s Current Framework 
Correctly labelled seafood, according to Canadian Food Inspection Agency (“CFIA”) 
regulation, has the net weight of the product, the country of origin, the country and time of 
processing (if processed), list of ingredients principal place of business and the common name 
of the main product (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2017). Mislabelling of a product may 
involve the violation of one or more of these areas, however, many are tested for by CFIA. 
Products are weighed, visual checks done to make sure seals are maintained and the origins of 
the product are back checked. However, the products are not DNA tested to ensure that they 
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are correct species listed on the documentation. Products shipped across the national and 
provincial borders are subject to the random inspections, but species identification relies on 
checking the product visually. CFIA regulation does not require information on country of 
origin or harvest method, meaning that once a product is harvested and has passed through at 
least one additional country before entering Canada, it can be mislabelled and all history before 
this country could be erased or changed. 
The current situation for seafood consumers in Canada is that nearly half of the products they 
are consuming are either fraudulently or unintentionally mislabelled. When products are 
mislabelled, that can result in illness and in extreme cases, death. For example, Escolar 
(Lepidocybium flavobrunneum) is one of the species often substituted for Albacore tuna; this 
same product is also poses a large health risk to consumers (Ling et al., 2008). It has 
indigestible wax esters which can cause diarrhea, acute gastrointestinal issues and in the case 
of pregnant women, can cause risks to the individual and child (Ling et al., 2008). This is not 
the only incidence where a mislabelled product presents a health risk. There are other losses 
associated with mislabelling such as consumer trust, ecological risks and economic losses to 
consumers, fishers and business (Stawitz et al., 2017).  
A leading researcher from the University of British Columbia on seafood mislabelling states 
that, “once the head and skin of a fish have been removed it can be difficult for consumers and 
professionals to tell the difference… [he often tries to] buy the whole fish, scales and all, 
because then it’s harder to mislabel the product” (Dimoff, 2018). Without DNA testing, 
processed products and in some cases, non-processed products, can be mislabelled and 
consumers face adverse health risks, over paying for lower value products and an overall sense 
of distrust in the market. 
CFIA has not responded to the studies showing seafood fraud and has not published any 
warnings or offered any solutions. However, in 2014 CFIA ensured the Canadian populous it 
would change regulations on Halal products to ensure that mislabelling would not occur. CFIA 
stated, “This change will also provide consistency for the industry and help prevent 
mislabelling practices and claims regarding halal food products” (Canada Food Inspection 
Agency, 2014). If the Canadian government is willing to put the time and effort into ensuring 
halal products are properly labelled, for both the domestic and imported products, then there 
should be no reason they would not commit the same to seafood products. The reasoning 
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behind this is unknown and presents a compelling reason to try and show where mislabelling 
is occurring potential solutions CFIA can put forward to combat it. 
2.5 Canadian Solutions and Conclusions 
To address the situation listed above, I believe that Canada must tailor the solutions Europe 
utilized to the Canadian political landscape. This includes stricter and improved labeling 
standards, genetic auditing and levying strong punishments for actors that do not abide by the 
legislations. These solutions should push mislabelling rates down substantially, save 
consumers money and prevent potential health issues from arising. These are necessary steps 
and how Europe applied them will be analyzed and adapted to Canada later in the paper.  
2.6 Outline 
The paper will begin by giving an understanding of the seafood supply chain and how the 
intricacies of it can be utilized by firms to intentionally mislabel products. I will then go into 
depth giving an understanding of what mislabelling is, how it occurs and what the implications 
of it are and who bears the various costs of these actions. Then I will review the current 
literature on the topic, focusing on the broad topic of seafood mislabelling initially then 
focusing on Europe and North America specifically, finally highlighting where this paper fits. 
I then begin to show the model used and outline the variable values and what they mean. It is 
applied to the stages of the supply chain outlined earlier in the paper and results analyzed. The 
ending of the paper focuses on what is currently happening in North America, what Europe 
did well to combat mislabelling and how Canada can adapt the European solution to fit their 
system of governance. Once these are offered, I give a set of actions that must be undertaken 
immediately by Canada, an order that is based on the return on investment, then I offer 
subsequent solutions that will continue to drive down mislabelling rates. I conclude that there 
must be action by CFIA and the government of Canada, the extent to which is negligible based 
on the value of fraud (which is currently unknown), but that legislation must be changed 
immediately and research into this issue needs to be undertaken immediately. 
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3. Background on Supply Chain & Mislabelling 
What is seafood mislabelling? Why does it occur? What are the implications? These three 
questions are dominant themes that must be explored and answered before delving deeply into 
this issue. First, what is seafood mislabelling in the context of this paper, it is, “when a product 
labelled as one species is in fact actually a different species, and can be a result of intentional 
product substitution, or can occur by accident” (Bailey, 2017). There are two major 
implications that arise from this definition, the first being that there is not a distinction between 
intentional and unintentional mislabelling. While the second implication is about the 
identification of one species is labelled as another species, not by a pseudonym or marketing 
term. The implications differ when considering if mislabelling is done intentionally or 
unintentionally and to better understand mislabelling, and the distinction between intentional 
and unintentional mislabelling, the seafood supply chain must first be examined. 
To understand the issue of mislabelling one first must understand the process a seafood 
product takes from origin to consumption. The intricacies of the supply chain allow for 
mislabelling to exist, thus in introducing these two topics I begin by giving an introduction 
into the seafood supply chain on a domestic level and international level. Following that, I 
explain what mislabelling is and how, using the complex supply chain, it has been able to 
thrive. Once these issues are understood, they can be used to show which actors are likely 
perpetuating seafood fraud and how. 
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3.1 Global Supply Chain 
 
Figure 2.2: Seafood Supply Chain (Manta Consulting 2015) 
This diagram highlights the main processes in the seafood supply chain. There are numerous 
players and processes that are required to occur for a consumer to receive a seafood product. 
This paper attempts to highlight where in this chain mislabelling occurs to the greatest extent. 
This supply chain is the same for a product that is domestic or one that takes an international 
route. To understand how it effects the Canadian market, this supply chain model will be 
applied to Canada in the following section, giving an in-depth understanding of the process of 
both domestic and imported products. To understand where mislabelling occurs, it is 
imperative to understand how products can be mislabeled, and to do that the supply chain 
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3.2 Canadian Seafood Supply Chain 
Breaking down each stage of the supply chain, the inputs and technology section refers to the 
permits and quotas for the harvest of fish, biotechnology and fish feed. For the purposes of 
this paper biotechnology will not be incorporated, as it does not play a major role in seafood 
mislabelling. Fish feed will be grouped with permits and quotas as the marine based inputs 
used in fish feed require a license or quota to harvest. Permits and quotas are given by domestic 
governments and determine who can harvest what product and how much. The issues that 
arises from this section regarding mislabelling are from products that are caught without a 
permit or quota, known as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (“IUU”) Fishing. The Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations states IUU fishing includes: 
“Fishing activities conducted in contravention of national, regional and international laws. 
Non-reporting, misreport or under-reporting of information on fishing operation and their 
catches. Fishing by “Stateless” vessels. Fishing in convention areas of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (RMFOs) by non-party vessels. Fishing Activities which are not 
regulated by States and cannot be easily monitored and accounted for.” (FAO, 2016) 
The only way for IUU fish to enter the supply chain is through mislabelling, as these products 
cannot be accounted for in the correct functioning supply chain model. The rationale behind 
this is that in a supply chain where mislabelling is eliminated, the origins of the product can 
be traced back to the point of harvest. When the point of harvest is identified and the producer, 
whether aquaculture or wild caught, can show the proper license and quota can be checked 
and the product can be identified as non-IUU. Therefore, solving for the mislabelling of 
seafood products produced and imported into Canada, would eliminate the ability of IUU 
products to enter the domestic consumer market. 
The second stage of the supply chain is the harvest and production stage, where the fish are 
either harvested from wild capture, produced by aquaculture or used in Aquaponics (the 
combination of traditional aquaculture and hydroponics in one integrated system). In this 
stage, the issues are largely the same as the previous section, regarding IUU products. For 
domestic production, IUU fisheries in Canada are not a large threat. In 2005, the Government 
of Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”) created the National Plan of Action 
to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans 2005). There were, however, previous overfishing concerns in Canada 
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where poor monitoring led to ineffective stock management, causing the 1990s collapse of the 
Atlantic Cod fishery in Eastern Canada (Myers, 1997). 
This led DFO to begin major stock assessments, both on Pacific and Atlantic species, and to 
implement stronger stock management. Two main management types for fisheries are 
currently used, Enterprise Allocations (“EA”) and Individual Transferable Quotas (“ITQ”). 
These market-based instruments are voted in by the members of the fishery and the governing 
body, in this case DFO (Le Gallic, 2003). 
An Enterprise allocation system is where a fisher is granted a license to take part in a fishery 
with a total allowable catch (“TAC”) of a species, or multiple species. The group of these 
fishers can harvest as much of the TAC as possible, reporting their harvest figures daily 
(Emery, 1993). Once the TAC is reached by the combined individuals in the fleet, or the 
harvest season ends, the fishery closes (Emery 1993). The TAC of a species is based upon 
various factors including stock assessments, catch record and developments in stock 
improvements (such as hatchery fish) (Emery, 1993). 
The ITQ system involves taking the TAC and giving each enterprise, or fisher, an individual 
share of the TAC. This system differs from open access by giving small portions of the TAC 
to each member of the fishery and they have the right to harvest, lease or sell their share of the 
catch (Buck, 1995). It establishes rights to a privileged share of the catch, as a percentage of 
the TAC in either pounds or individual pieces. Since it is done as a percentage of TAC, the 
annual harvestable quantity may not be the same (Buck 1995).  
By 2003 DFO had implemented ITQ management systems in fisheries that represented 50% 
of the landed value of all seafood in Canada (Le Gallic, 2003). These systems require stringent 
oversight with strong wording in the licensing agreement, daily logbook requirements and 
reporting, gear tags, at-sea observing, dockside third-party catch verification and other 
verification measures (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2017). This oversight, and the use 
of market based approaches, has stabilized the management of domestic fisheries. 
Domestic Aquaculture and Aquaponics have strong oversight in their production, with strict 
monitoring by DFO and CFIA. This makes mislabelling of product challenging in the domestic 
market. Moreover, aquaculture producers most frequently sell their product to distributors or 
processors (or act as processors themselves). This pushes their product on to the next stage of 
the supply chain, which will be addressed further on in the analysis. 
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The third stage of the supply chain is the collection from the harvesters and aquaculture 
suppliers. As this is an intermittent logistical stage, it will be combined with the following 
stage, since this aspect of the supply chain is usually undertaken by the businesses transacting.  
The next stage is the most likely point of mislabelling, according to the author, the value-
added preparations stage (which also encompasses seafood importing). This is where a product 
is transformed from a whole fish, to various forms including, but not limited it, fillets, portions, 
smoked products, ground products and dried goods. When products are transformed their 
distinct morphological characteristics, in this case skin (or scales), fins and head, are often 
removed and all that is left is flesh. This is the most likely stage of mislabelling because when 
distinguishing characteristics of a product are removed, without DNA testing it is nearly 
impossible to prove that a product is labelled correct. There is not mandatory genetic testing 
at any stage throughout the supply chain in Canada currently, thus, once a product is processed, 
it becomes whatever the processor identifies it as. The University of Guelph has one of the 
most extensive DNA barcoding databanks of seafood products and has done much of the 
research for the various studies in Canada on mislabelling (Naaum & Hanner, 2015). Hanner, 
and colleagues from the University of Guelph have created Tru-Id, a certification program 
where a business can undergo an audit and prove, using their DNA database, the genetic make-
up of their product, proving it is correctly labelled (Tru-id). In a sense, this is the private 
business version of the EU’s Labelfish program, and is meant to help identify the same issues, 
however, adoption in the industry has not been widespread, with only one seafood supplier 
currently undertaking this process (Tru-id). 
In Canada, seafood importing, processing, preparation and packaging was a 4.28 billion CAD 
business in 2012; however, there are only 722 registered businesses that operate in this 
segment (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2016). It is highly unlikely that these businesses 
are of equal size, as many of these 722 businesses may be small local processing plants, with 
a few entities that control much of production and importing. Regardless, the average will be 
used, which is equal to 5,927,977.84 CAD per year per business for processing or importing 
value2. This shows a high incentive to cheat. As mentioned earlier, CFIA and DFO have not 
openly acknowledged the reports on mislabelling, therefore, without any risk of punishment, 
                                                
2 Figure is calculated using the total value of seafood processing divided by the number of businesses operating to get an 
average, though likely this is not the case it gives an idea of scale 
 15 
the incentive to mislabel a cheaper product for a more valuable product comes without major 
punishment or risk. 
Imported Seafood is scrutinised by CFIA, with various regulations on the product (Appendix 
1). CFIA requires 19 protocols to be fulfilled, including listing the company the product was 
imported from, the product name, the Canadian name and genius; however, nowhere in the 
document or on the CFIA compliance website is genetic verification listed (Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency 2017). Therefore, for visibly wrong product, CFIA can punish the importer, 
but for products that need to be genetically proven to be mislabelled there exists no oversight. 
Moreover, there are no requirements for the product to be labelled as wild or farmed, or to list 
where it originated. This means that the importer relies on the word of the exporter. Thus, 
either the importer can be privy to this information, and choose to act fraudulently, or can be 
naive and be acting fraudulently by accident. In either case, there is no way, without genetic 
verification, to prove either case. 
Regarding the next, and final step in the supply chain, the distribution and logistics sector, 
there exists numerous entities and types of businesses that operate in this segment. In this 
paper, this section will be referred to as the retail section. Retail refers to the sale to consumers 
either through markets, such as grocery stores, farmer’s markets and direct from fishers, it will 
also include restaurants, catering and other food service industry. This step of the supply chain 
faces the greatest scrutiny for mislabelling from provincial governments and local health 
authorities. The testing that has identified mislabelling, has largely been done at this stage in 
the supply chain (except for Tru-id and Labelfish).  
At this stage of the supply chain, CFIA steps back from the process and hands the governing 
of the health of patrons, sanitation and product quality checks to provincial entities and health 
authorities (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2017). The scrutiny faced by the businesses at 
this stage of the supply chain is quite extensive, with strict procedural guidelines and sanitation 
standards. Moreover, as consumer advocacy groups, such as Oceana and SeaChoice, take 
samples from these groups and find instances of mislabelling they have the means to expose 
which businesses are involved in seafood fraud. While there exists no legislation on seafood 
mislabelling for these parties in Canada, exposing them threatens their business. Moreover, as 
solutions are presented later, the EU has punished suppliers and parties with fines and pending 
fines, while also harmonizing all consumer labels into a government standard (Office Controls 
and Enforcement 2018). For these reasons, and economic reasons that will be explained later, 
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there exists an incentive to mislabel (the increased profits from selling lower value products 
as higher value products) however, there are risks to the businesses reputation and even 
operations, from the policing by health authorities, the provincial governments and seafood 
advocacy groups.  
3.3 Mislabelling – What is it? 
Mislabelling has various forms within seafood, as mentioned earlier the definition this paper 
will use is when a species is incorrectly, or intentionally, mislabelled as another species. 
Another example of this incorrect labelling, which will not be analyzed in this paper, involves 
the “marketing” of a product under another name. Oceana’s study on mislabelling highlighted 
this in Canada where, in various retail locations including restaurants and grocery stores, 
Atlantic Salmon (Salmo Salar) was sold as Pacific Salmon, a species that does not exist 
(Oceana, 2017). There are various types of Pacific Salmon, such as Coho, Chinook, Pink and 
Sockeye; however, there is no actual species known as Pacific Salmon. 
This type of mislabelling confuses consumers on the nature of their product by choosing names 
that are not identified by the governing body as the correct name. The reason this is done is to 
give consumers a name that is more appealing or recognizable. An example of this is 
Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides), a name which few consumers would every 
recognize; however, most people who eat seafood have tried this product (Diaz, 2003). To 
consumers, this product is known as Chilean Seabass; though technically correct, the true 
species name is Patagonian Toothfish and the adapted name was to make the product more 
appealing (Diaz, 2003). 
CFIA has specific names that must be used for products, allowing consumers to understand 
what they are purchasing; however, there is little enforcement of this. The most identifiable 
case of this occurring was in 2014 when the Quebec Ministry of Agriculture found 32% of 
tested seafood samples and fined those who were identified as fraudulently marketing their 
products (CBC, 2014). This type of mislabelling happens at the retail stage of the supply chain, 
and would be considered fraudulent marketing. For the purposes of this paper, fraudulent 
marketing does not contribute the greatest risk to the seafood supply chain. This paper will 
focus on the mislabelling that occurs when seafood is sold as different species (with the 
purpose of increasing profit), not products that are sold under a different branded product. 
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Seafood fraud is economically motivated, but which stage of the supply chain has firms that 
are the most motived has not been identified. If mislabelling rates were extremely low it could 
be argued that some products were accidentally mixed up as other similar products; however, 
Europe addressed seafood fraud showing, that it is not always an accident. There are 
incentives, but the incentives and punishments at each stage of the supply chain differ. For 
example, the incentive for a fisherman selling to a fish plant to mislabel is relatively high, he 
can try to get more money for the fish he has caught. There are also many factors that 
discourage him including government oversight, risk of losing the buyer if he is caught lying, 
potential fines or punishments and more. Therefore, although an incentive exists, there are 
reasons for this actor not to do this. This paper will use try to look at each supply chain stage 
through an economic model and identify which stage has the greatest incentives to act 
fraudulently, what motivates them to do so, what other factors affect their decision and, finally, 
this paper will try to offer ways they can be dissuaded from fraud. 
As this paper is not addressing marketing issues, they will largely not be addressed in the 
solutions. The solutions to marketing practices fall on CFIA to find a solution with local health 
authorities and provincial governments. CFIA has a mandated list of names for products and 
they must ensure these are used throughout the supply chain, not only when product crosses 
some sort of border. Since this issue is technically addressed (though not dealt with in practice) 
the model will not address it. But, by implementing some random audits on genetic testing, 
actors that are found to be using names that do not match the Genius can be punished as a 
fraudulent actor. This helps address the issue, but the real solution to this issue requires CFIA 
to act on its mandate and punish those parties that are not using correct names. 
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4. Literature Review 
The literature that exists on seafood fraud can be broken into two main topics, proving the 
existence of seafood fraud in various markets and potential solutions to mislabelling. I am not 
aware of any research that identifies exactly where mislabelling occurs or how to effectively 
combat it at the given stage. This paper is attempting to bridge the two bodies of work to create 
a better understanding of the issues and offer a meaningful way to use government and 
industries limited resources to effectively combat them. Without this bridging, problems will 
continue to exist and solutions will be nothing more than theoretical options. The goal of this 
undertaking is to show there exists one area where mislabelling is most incentivized and offer 
some suggestions on how it can be dealt with in a cost-effective manner. 
Literature on European seafood fraud effectively pushed government to intervene. This 
decreased the rates of mislabelling to the lowest in the world and is an example of what can 
be accomplished when government intervenes. These solutions have been suggested for 
Canada by academic and NGOs, but there has been little action by any governing body to 
make progress in this area. This paper will try to solve for this, and the literature reviewed 
below will be the basis for the discussion on the issues and solutions. 
4.1 Seafood Fraud Work 
In 1998, a paper presented at the Technology Society of Americas would be the first step in 
identifying a food safety and economic fraud epidemic on a global scale. This paper, which 
collected data from 1988 to 1997, highlighted how the FDA in the United States tested seafood 
products and found that 37% of fish and 13% of shellfish and other bivalves were mislabelled 
(Tennyson et al., 1997). The Global Food and Agricultural Organization (“FAO”) had been 
trying to create regulation on the seafood supply chain through global labelling requirements. 
Due to backlash from countries, including Peru and the European Union it was unlikely this 
global standard would exist. When compounded with domestic issues in the United States, the 
goal of a global labelling standard was dropped. 
In the United States, companies were fighting against the Country of Origin Label (“COOL”) 
requirement, a standard set out by the United States government (Jacquet and Pauly, 2008). 
The only option for the FAO was to require that a single location for country of origin existed, 
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which for unprocessed product was the country of harvest and for processed products, the 
country of processing. This was much less than the FAO originally had hoped for, and this 
even took 4 year to be finalized (Alimentarius, 1999). This solution by the FAO created even 
greater issues in the future, as illegal fish could be caught in one country, processed in another 
and then sold as legal fish in a third, with the governing bodies inability to identify where it 
had originated, as per FAO regulation. Countries created their own legislation on labelling, 
scientific name, origin, harvest method and more, using the FAO requirement as a minimum 
standard (Moretti et al., 2003). The papers that followed would deal with regional or country 
based fraud as addressing this issue on a global scale was too great an issue.  
The above information existed for nearly half a decade before a ground-breaking article in 
Marine Policy, that has since been cited just under three hundred times, was featured. The 
article, Trade Secrets: Renaming and mislabelling of seafood, compiled a global data set on 
mislabelling rates. The article then went on to identify how countries and international 
governing bodies perpetuated the issues. They present a compelling case and concluded that 
the newly created Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”) should become the global standard 
on supply chain custody via their audit and certification system (Pauly and Jacquet, 2008). 
Critics have argued that the pay-for-usage model MSC uses compromises their legitimacy as 
they are incentivized to label more products as MSC certified to generate greater revenue 
(Zwerdling and Williams, 2013). Others argue that MSC has lowered their bar for 
standardization and finally, MSC may be too big to properly certify small artisanal fisheries 
and is slow changing their ratings (Zwerdling and Williams, 2013). 
4.2 Dealing with Fraud in Europe 
Inaction by the European Governing bodies on the issue of mislabelling drove scientists to 
show the extent of this issue. A paper published in 2010 highlighted that 25% of Cod and 
Haddock products were mislabelled and that 82.4% of the smoked products tested were 
mislabelled in the EU (Miller and Mariani, 2010). The project was undertaken to highlight that 
correct labelling can encourage sustainable fisheries, as consumers desire this product and will 
actively seek out correctly labelled products (Miller and Mariani, 2010). However, in trying 
to do that the authors discovered a fraud epidemic. It was felt that until mislabelling was dealt 
with there would be no recovery in cod stocks as fishers would be incentivized to harvest the 
depleted stocks, have them processed elsewhere, mislabel them as other products, and allow 
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them to enter the supply chain, causing both economic and environmental issues (Miller and 
Mariani, 2010). This paper showed the ineffectiveness of the EU’s preventative legislation for 
mislabelling and showed that consumers were still were being deceived and were facing both 
an economic and welfare loss, even with groups like MSC existing. Moreover, they 
highlighted how some of these products could be coming from IUU fisheries or depleted 
stocks, further exacerbating issues. Overall, Miller and Mariana’s (2010) article highlighted 
the costs of seafood mislabelling to the fisheries industry, on the environment and that 
consumers were funding this. 
In 2015, Mariani and another team wrote a follow-up article on how mislabelling rates had 
declined in Europe (Mariani et al., 2015). In this article, as well as Helyar’s article on fish 
product mislabelling, the findings were much more positive than the previous article. 
Mislabelling rates were down to single digits, in the Helyar article rates of mislabelling were 
5.5% and in the Mariani article they were 4.93% (Helyar et al., 2014; Mariani et al., 2015). 
This immense drop in the mislabelling rates was consistent with other papers findings, and a 
list of contributing factors was compiled which included media coverage, improved and 
binding labeling regulations and a notice that consumers have influenced the change (Mariani 
et al., 2015).  
These papers did identify one trend that continued to be an issue, mislabelling was most 
frequent in processed products (Helyar et al., 2014). These products were mislabelled at twice 
the average rate of other products (13.6% compared to 5.5% and 4.93%) (Helyar et al., 2014; 
Mariani et al., 2015). According to the European Market Observatory for Fisheries and 
Aquaculture products, 68% of seafood products are totally or partially processed, making up 
a majority of the market (Marine Affairs and Fisheries – EU, 2016). 
The European solution of putting binding regulation on labelling where products have come 
from, how they were harvested and what is included in the product, has proven effective. 
However, to apply this to other countries is difficult, the United States populous is much less 
receptive to strong government intervention and would prefer market factors deal with issues 
rather than government intervention. In Canada, the problem of various governing bodies 
having overlapping jurisdictions creates controversy about which body is to deal with each 
specific issue. Had the papers helped to show the economic incentives of mislabelling as well 
as the most important areas to police, there may have been more value.  
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The papers on the European solution to seafood fraud ignore a very important piece of 
information – why – why would there be mislabelling, what punishments do they face for 
mislabelling, how much benefits do they receive from acting fraudulently. These papers all 
show mislabelling is present and that it has negative implications, both on consumers and the 
seafood industry, however, no costs are ever accounted for and who bears the brunt of these 
issues is never addressed. These papers do not look at the externalities of this mislabelling, 
such as loss of consumer trust, economic losses to consumers and how much revenue is 
generated from product fraud. The key though that all literature on the European sector is 
missing is where does mislabelling occur in the supply chain. Europe has seemingly solved 
the issue better than any other nations; however, they have not put forward any information 
on where mislabelling occurs most frequently and who needs to be policed most strongly.  
4.3 Fraud in North America 
With a grasp of the literature on seafood fraud in general and how Europe used academic 
literature to guide policy, it is imperative to understand the literature from North America. It 
shares many parallels; however, it has not had the same impact on policy or regulation. 
The Jacquet and Pauly article blew open the doors, showing the extent of North American 
seafood fraud. Since then there has been substantial work done by others. In that same year, 
there was a solution proposed: DNA barcoding to identify mislabelling (Wong and Hanner 
2008). The technique was successful in 90 out of 91 samples and presented a cost-effective 
way to identify when products were mislabelled (Wong and Hanner, 2008). The article showed 
how consumers were attempting to purchase products that were from healthy stocks, therefore 
doing the right thing for the environment and industry; however, in 25% of these cases the 
products were mislabelled and often were endangered or threatened species instead of the 
sustainable option they were seeking (Wong and Hanner, 2008). Moreover, they found some 
species were very frequently mislabelled, such as red snapper (Pristipomoides sieboldii) which 
in three quarters of cases were mislabelled according to this study and previous others (Wong 
and Hanner 2008). This paper even goes as far as to touch on the potential economic 
implication of these issues, acknowledging this to be a key contributing factor to the issue 
(Wong and Hanner, 2008). 
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Many of the scientific papers that address mislabelling in seafood ignore the social and 
economic implications. Wong and Hanner’s paper touches on this matter, and though it is 
brief, this is one of the first cases that presents this issue with estimated costs. They mention 
how the market price of “red snapper” at the time of writing was 2.93 USD per pound, while 
the species that was most frequently mislabelled as red snapper was redfish, which along with 
other oceanic perch species, had a price of .72 USD per pound. In the South United States, 
according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), Red Snapper 
harvest figures from both recreational and commercial fisheries accounted for approximate 
9.1 million pounds (NOAA, 2017). This quantity of fish would serve a large portion, if not all, 
of the North American demand for red snapper; however, much of this product is exported, 
and cheaper, often mislabelled product, is imported to fulfill the demand. The United States 
market imported approximately 11 million pounds of snapper at this time, with prices ranging 
from 3 USD to 5.5 USD per kilogram, or approximate 1.37 USD per pound to 2.55 USD per 
pound (Tveteras, 2012). Using this information, combined with Wong and Hanner’s findings, 
if three quarters of these products are mislabelled, and the value differential between the most 
common substitute (redfish) and red snapper is 2.21 USD, then there is a lost value to 
consumers of just over 18.23 million USD3, a significant loss to consumers and a threat to 
consumer trust. The Wong and Hanner paper brings light to this issue, but does not push the 
depth far enough to cause governments to change their agenda and make this a key issue.  
The most comprehensive review on seafood fraud in North America was put forward by 
Oceana, an environmental NGO, that provided data, offered causation for the issues and 
presented some potential solutions to the issue in North America. 
This report, released in 2012, has much of the same findings as previous reports, with 33% of 
products mislabelled, with peaks in snapper (87%) and tuna (59%) (Warner et al., 2013). The 
below figures show the mislabelling rates across all products sampled. 
                                                
3 Calculated using the imported figure multiplied by the price differential and the average mislabelling of three quarters 
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Figure 3.1: Mislabelling Among Most Commonly Sampled Fish Types (Warner et al. 2013) 
They acknowledge a key attribute that few other papers do, “… fishermen already provide 
much of this information at the dock, little to none of it follows the fish throughout the supply 
chain” (Warner et al., 2013). There exists the ability for transparency in the supply chain, but 
no party has ensured this information is carried throughout. 
This paper does come up short in conclusion and recommendations. They recommend that the 
federal government increase testing for seafood fraud in the United States (currently less than 
1% is tested) and this is a good recommendation; however, it is obvious. Oceana ignores the 
political and economic reasons behind this not already being done; if it would benefit all 
parties, then rationally, it would point to this already being done. The consumer 
recommendations are equally weak including: ask questions, check the price and purchase 
whole fish. Except for the last option, the other two are no more informative than if the 
consumer did nothing. What questions do they ask? Who are they asking? Is this person 
informed? Checking the price is also not a solution, the price is set by the market, it tells you 
nothing more than the value of the good to consumers, there are too many externalities for this 
to help identify if a product was labelled correctly. Only the last option presents a reasonable 
way to identify if the product is labelled correctly, but even this conclusion is weak. A 
consumer cannot be expected to be able to identify the subtle differences between similar 
products. For example, it is easy enough to tell the difference between a halibut and a salmon, 
but identifying the difference between a Pacific and Atlantic halibut, or between a Sockeye 
salmon and a Chum salmon, is extremely difficult to experts in the industry, let alone 
consumers. 
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These articles all do a fine at showing that an issue exists in North America, but that is not 
enough. They largely ignore solutions and economic ramifications, unlike their European 
counterparts that took a much broader look at the issue. They also fail to address things like 
consumer advocacy groups and the ability of government to make meaningful policy. Most of 
all, they do not consider the costs and benefits of their solutions. They throw solutions out 
there that are cover-ups rather than addressing the root of the issue.  
4.4 Contribution to the Existing Literature 
Taking articles on seafood fraud as a general area, then understanding how Europe 
successfully combatted and finally how these lessons can be used for North America gives 
perspective, but it is not complete. There needs to be a deeper understanding what motivates 
actors to act fraudulently, to understand which actors are most likely to commit fraud and how 
to apply the learnings from this to solve for fraud in North America. 
This paper aims to prove that it is possible for Canada’s government to utilize their limited 
resources on a specific set of policies that should combat fraud. By identifying which actors 
benefit most from fraud, the Canadian government can create policy that helps to decrease 
mislabelling and increase consumer confidence. As it currently stands the Canadian 
government largely chooses not to act, due to lack of information. This paper will set out to 
give information that influences Canada and CFIA to act. 
The model used in the next section will attempt to show to show the incentives from each 
stage of the supply chain. This will help to bridge the gaps in the literature and solve for the 
issues addressed at the beginning of this section – how can the research that has been done on 
mislabelling in various areas be backed with economic theory and present a compelling case 





5. A Model of Incentives for Mislabelling 
5.1 Seafood Market Model in North America 
Canada has experienced rapid growth in the demand for seafood with 79% of Canadians eating 
seafood regularly or occasionally, with up to 80% of that seafood being imported (Oceana, 
2017). This rise in global seafood trading has been seen around the globe and has coincided 
with the rise of globalisation in many markets. However, where seafood lacks in contrast to 
other products is the ability to identify where the product originated and if it is correctly 
labelled. Food health risks are increasing as well, according to the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention 1 in 6 Americans get sick from food borne illness each year, and this has 
coincided with a growth in seafood consumption (from 10-12 pounds per person to 16.5 
pounds) as well as an increase in illnesses brought on by seafood consumption (from less than 
100 cases in the 1980s to just below 600 in 2006) (Iwamoto et al., 2010; Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2017). The rise in the global seafood trade and the rise in food borne 
illness are not coincidence, but are symptoms of each other. As supply chain complexity has 
arisen, as has the ability to mislabel products to increase profits, risking consumer welfare and 
costing them money. A product that is exposed to higher temperatures, or to bacteria, viruses 
or parasites, presents a health risk to consumers. With an inability to effectively understand 
the path of a product through the supply chain. 
This has allowed for economic mislabelling. If products are difficult to track, unscrupulous 
actors can fraudulently label their product as a higher value product, increasing their 
profitability. This allows the entrance of IUU product into the chain, or in a more dangerous 
scenario, the seller can mislabel a compromised product as a different, uncompromised 
product. This increases health risk to consumers and can potentially result in deaths. 
5.2 Variables 
Empirically investing non-compliance is difficult as it is in the interest of firms to keep their 
product information hidden. There are two reasons for this, the first being that since seafood 
is a commodity business with low differentiation on product, sharing any business information 
(including suppliers, product information or processes) to competitors can erode the margins 
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of a business. The second reason is that making supply chain data public would eliminate the 
ability of mislabelling firms to continue to mislabel. Therefore, firms that are not mislabelling 
may make their information public, but because of the first reason they also may not. Thus, if 
a firm does not publicize their data, they cannot be assumed to be mislabelling. The only 
foolproof way of identifying if a firm is not mislabelling is them doing DNA authentication 
and supply chain audits; however, this is not industry standard and few firms undertake this 
process. Firms that are at other stages of the supply chain perpetuate this issue as well, not 
giving up their sources or customers for many of  the same reasons, but also not to be 
implicated with mislabelling if a customer or supplier is caught. These firms, in practice, are 
operating in a grey zone where non-compliance data can only be collected when the firms are 
caught, which currently, none have. 
Since the data on supply chain sand products tends to be private, identifying if a firm is 
undertaking mislabelling or not, at a given stage of the supply chain, can only be done using 
theory. This is also upheld by other firms that may not be mislabelling, because If a firm is 
worried about non-compliance in their supply chain they are more prone to hide potential data 
that could implicate them. These firms, in practice, are operating in a grey zone where non-
compliance data can only be collected when the firms are caught, which currently, none have. 
In my model, firm’s decisions to label correctly or act fraudulently depends on parameter 
values. As mentioned above, collecting these values is not possible, as the information remains 
private. To overcome this, I utilized industry knowledge, expert opinion and literature. I use 
this to generate plausible ranges of parameters that allows the model to predict firms labelling 
behaviour at each stage of the supply chain 
5.3 The Model 
In the model, firms face a choice between correct labelling practices or mislabelling of seafood 
products. The model I have created uses the basic of the decision making found in Becker’s 
(1968) paper on Crime and Punishment. This model was created to determine the expected 
utility of an individual that is faced with the choice commit, or not commit a crime. The 
individual receives a given utility from abstaining from the crime. However, if the individual 
decides to break the law, they receive a different utility based on whether they are caught or 
not. If they break the law and are not caught, they receive a benefit greater than their utility of 
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being lawful equal to the value of what is attained from the crime. If, they break the law and 
are caught, they not only do not gain the new expected utility from the benefit of the crime, 
they receive a value lower than the lawful utility; the value is equal to the utility of acting 
lawfully minus the punishment associated with crime. There is a value for the risk of being 
caught, this value helps to determine the perceived value of committing the crime. 
In this model, Becker has shown the justification for an actor to determine the utility attained 
from committing a crime, allowing them to value the costs and benefits of the give crime, 
helping to decide if the actor will commit it. When applying this model to seafood mislabelling 
certain aspects are adapted. Consider a firm in the seafood industry, they could be at any stage 
of the supply chain and they face two decisions on how to act. The firm could choose to 
correctly label their product and sell a given quantity (𝑄"#$) at the market price (𝑃#$) to get a 
profit equal to the product (𝑄"#$ ∗ 𝑃#$) of these values (P#$
(")*). If the firm chooses to mislabel 
there are two ways it can end. They can mislabel and not get caught, this means that their 
reputation is not affected, that they face no fine and they receive a profit equal to the quantity 
they sell at increased price from the mislabelled product. The firm would face the risk of being 
caught (1 − b) multiplied by the quantity of mislabelled product (𝑄"-$) and the market price 
plus the expected profit from mislabelling each product (𝑃#$ + 𝐸𝑃-$) to determine how much 
value could be gained from mislabelling. The firm also must account for the risk of being 
caught and potential loses to their reputation and customer base. This is shown by including 
the risk of being caught time the costs to the reputation and any fines, costs to the business and 
restitution payments, equal to (− b ∗ 𝐹 + 𝑅 ). Taken together, these two cases show the 
potential profitability of a firm that chooses to mislabel (𝐸P-$(")*) by accounting for the 
potential profits (and potential costs) the firm faces. The quantity of this product and the 
market price of it are held constant to the given firm at each stage and do not change whether 
the product is labelled correctly or not. When taken together, the incentive for mislabelling is 
a combination of these two outcomes, where the expected profit attained from mislabelling is 
compared to the profit from correctly labeling and compared to determine the incentive for a 
given firm to act fraudulently. On a market level, if each individual firm’s incentive to mislabel 
at the given stage is great enough, then it is assumed that all firms will mislabel. This is 
represented in the below model: 
Firm level, 
𝐸P-$(")* = − b ∗ 𝐹 + 𝑅 + [ 1 − b ∗ 𝑄"-$ ∗ 𝑃#$ + 𝐸𝑃-$ ] 
P#$
(")* = 𝑄"#$ ∗ 𝑃#$  
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𝐸P-$(")* > P#$(")* Mislabelling is preferred; P#$(")* > 𝐸P-$(")* No incentive to mislabel 
 
Where, 
𝐸P-$(")* = Profit from mislabelling 
P#$
(")* = Profit from correct labeling 
𝑄 = Quantity of product, >0 
𝑅 = Reputational risk or loss of goodwill associated with being caught mislabelling 
𝑃 = Constant marginal profit per unit of product net of all relevant costs, > 0; and such that 
the expected profit per unit of mislabelling (𝐸𝑃-$) is >= the profit per unit of correctly 
labeled products (𝑃#$); 𝐸𝑃-$ >=0 
b = Perceived probability of being caught mislabelling 
𝐹 = Cost of being caught such as fine or loss of business 
i; 1…I represents the individual firms in the market 
 
In the model, I assume that the price of the mislabeled product is greater than the price of the 
correctly labelled product, otherwise there is no logical reason to mislabel. Also, I assume that 
there is more than one firm in the market; however, even if there is incentive to mislabel on a 
per firm basis, some may not choose to do so. Therefore, even if the profit for mislabelling is 
greater than correct labeling, some firms may choose not to mislabel, or some firms may 
mislabel some products but not all.  
In this model 𝐸𝑃-$, 𝐹, 𝑅 and b all determine the 𝐸P-$(")*  for a given firm. These values are 
all negative correlated with the expected profitability and the greater they become the less 
incentive a firm has. b can be a value between 0 and 1, as this number nears one, the firm is 
more likely to be caught cheating. The greater the 𝑅 value, the greater the reputational damage 
associated with being caught mislabelling and the greater the damage. This can be in the form 
of lost business, poor media or overall devaluation of trust. Finally, as 𝐹 increases, the larger 
the cost on the business, potentially to the point where the 𝐸𝑃-$ is completely lost and e 
𝐸P-$(")* is negative. This is shown below. 
Probability being caught mislabelling correlated with respect to expected profitability, 
𝜕𝐸P-$(")*
𝜕𝛽 = − 𝐹 + 𝑅 − (𝑄 𝑃 + 𝐸𝑃 ) 
Cost of being caught mislabelling correlated with respect to expected profitability, 
𝜕𝐸P-$(")*
𝜕𝐹 = −𝛽 
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Reputational cost of being caught mislabelling correlated with respect to expected 
profitability, 
𝜕𝐸P-$(")*
𝜕𝑅 = −𝛽 
Expected profit per unit from mislabelling with respect to marginal profit per unit of correct 
labeling, 
𝜕𝐸P-$(")*
𝜕𝐸𝑃 = 1 − 𝛽 𝑄 
Applying this model to each stage of the supply chain, the values for each variable will change 
and this will allow the model to effectively show the given incentives to mislabel or to act 
correctly at the given stage. This then will help identify the position where CFIA can dedicate 
their resources most efficiently to combat seafood fraud.  
If all seafood products were DNA authenticated, the cost would outweigh the potential benefits 
to consumer’s health and the economic gains. However, by identifying the potential gains from 
mislabelling at each stage in the supply chain this model will show the most incentivized firms. 
This will then be used to guide CFIA on how to authenticate products most effectively. 
5.4 Harvester to First Production Point 
The profit gained from a seafood transaction by a harvester is maximized when the price they 
received is the highest. The purchaser of the product from the harvester is referred to the as 
first production point (as shown in the supply chain model). The variable values used for this 
stage of the supply chain show the lack of incentive for a harvester to mislabel their product 
when selling to a first production point. 
The harvester (either a fisher or aquaculture producer) is incentivized to try and maximize 
their profit, yet the purchaser of their product, the first production point buyer is trying to do 
the same. This buyer is well informed on the product they are buying and their profit comes 
from the ability to pay the lowest possible price for the product they are receiving. To do this 
effectively, they must know the product and the characteristics of it, as well as its market value. 
Thus, when the primary producer or harvester tries to falsely label their product, the first 
purchaser should be able to quickly identify the false claim, implying a high likelihood of 
being caught. In many countries, Canada being one, there is oversight from a governing body 
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that requires information on species, harvest area, and other details. This model does not 
mention that, but it is acknowledged by the author and further makes the case that this stage 
is not the leading cause of mislabelling.  
At this stage of the supply chain, while the likelihood of being caught is very high, the cost is 
minimal. Potential costs would be the transaction cost of having to change buyers, have low 
prices to account for the risk of fraud or more oversight of harvesters. These costs are small, 
but do make mislabelling less appealing. Unless the price of the mislabeled product is 
substantially greater than the correctly labelled product, there is no justification to attempt 
mislabelling as the risks would be too great. When extrapolating this across the various firms, 
it would show that the profit from correctly labelling would be greater, or at the very least, 
equal to mislabelling expected profits. When accounting for the various costs mislabelling 
could have on a harvester, if the profit is equal, then it is assumed a firm would choose to 
correctly label. 
The only potential exceptions to this is if the harvesters collude with the purchasers to work 
together to mislabel or if the products are processed onboard the vessel to the point where they 
are unidentifiable. Both scenarios are illegal and unlikely, although they may occur in some 
scenarios they do not represent most cases and therefore do not impact the outcome. 
Based upon the variable values utilized at this stage, the firms are not incentivized to mislabel 
their products, as they will receive greater profits from correct labelling. This only holds true 
if the purchasers are informed and are not colluding with the harvester to share profits; 
however, due to purchaser’s desire to maximize their profits, the best option for them is to 
push the price down as far as possible and not profit share. Moreover, in developed markets 
like Canada there exists validation processes to ensure the products harvested off vessels are 
correctly identified. As for imported products, these values hold true. Moreover, Canadian 
importers are often not purchasing their product directly from harvesters from other countries, 
without having some form of validation. They must provide country of harvest to CFIA if this 
product is coming direct from the harvester, making mislabelling difficult. Thus, this exchange 
in the seafood supply chain need not receive DNA testing by CFIA. 
Where, 
𝑄 is constant for both CL and ML, small figure 
𝑅 is near 0 
b is high, nearing 1 




(")* > 𝐸P-$(")*  
5.5 First Producer to Value Add 
The incentive structure in this section is analogous to the previous section, with a few 
distinct differences. With the expected profit being greater from mislabelling than correctly 
labelling the product, there is initial the incentive to mislabel. Moreover, at this stage in the 
supply chain there are fewer suppliers than the previous stage. In the harvester to first 
production point stage of the supply chain there are numerous actors. They include major 
commercial fishing vessels, small family vessels, large aquaculture operations, small 
aquaculture operations and various other types of harvesters. These harvesters do not each 
have a different purchaser they sell to, and in many cases entire fleets or coastal areas will 
sell to a single first production point. Therefore, there is a consolidation of product in fewer 
primary production points. What this means is that at this stage there are fewer transactions, 
but they tend to have greater value and higher quantities. The market value will be 
comparable to the previous stage, but the quantity of product sold by each firm will be 
greater, increasing the firms bargaining power. 
A few variable values change at this stage, the greatest being reputational risk. In the 
previous stage reputational risk is minimal, if a harvester mislabels their product to the 
buyer, the buyer should be able to identify it immediately and negotiate to the correctly 
labelled price of the product. The reputation of the harvester may be slightly tarnished, but 
since the market determines price and the buyer is the one paying for it, their reputational 
accounts for little and is largely unaffected. However, comparing that outcome to this stage 
of the model changes things. The actors in this stage of the supply chain are much larger, 
thus the quantity of goods exchanged at each transaction tends to be much greater. 
Therefore, if a transaction is caught as being fraudulently labeled by the value-add 
distributor, this party will look to another trusted source of supply. Even though there exists 
some fine or cost to this party, the greatest risk comes in the loss of business and the cost 
associated with a tarnished reputation. The nominal fine for selling illegal seafood in Canada 
is up to 100,000 CAD and up to two years in prison (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2017). 
However, in the first major case of its kind, CFIA and the Justice Department of Ontario 
levied a fine of 1.2 Million CAD on Mucci Farms, with executives being charged 150,000 
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CAD each and facing three months’ probation (Buck, 2016). Mucci Farms was found to be 
labelling product as Canadian, when the products had been imported from other countries. 
This is the first major case of this nature and highlights the potential costs of being caught 
mislabelling; however, it also shows the risks that come from the media attention associated 
with mislabelling. Since this incident, Mucci Farm’s story has been covered by various news 
outlets including the Financial Post, Globe and Mail and CTV. Their brand may recover, but 
if this were to be a seafood company, the outcomes may be amplified, as the health risks 
from fraudulent seafood consumption are often greater than other food products. 
With the other variables largely remaining the same as the previous section, although the 
quantity per exchange is greater and expected price received could potentially be much 
greater than the true market value of the product, there are some large deterrents to 
mislabelling. The risk of being caught remains relatively high and the potential loss of a 
customer, when the number of transactions is low but quantities are large, is a deterrent. 
Pairing that with the potentially high reputational costs of being caught, either by CFIA 
(which seems unlikely as they have never acted on this stage of the supply chain) or by the 
value-adding customer (much more likely, but with less legal implications), the incentive is 
low. Moreover, at this stage the product is still a whole fish, which makes it very difficult to 
mislabel the product to the experts (the purchasers) and thus, the likelihood of being caught 
mislabelling remains high. 
To summarize the findings from this stage, there now exists the theoretical potential for 
major financial implications if caught, but in seafood specifically, this has yet to happen and 
thus fines from the governing body remain minimal or non-existent. The potential of being 
caught is quite high, there is a good chance that the fish will be correctly identified as 
mislabeled by the purchaser and therefore, either bought as the correct product for the 
correct price, or refused to be purchased. If this product is identified as mislabelled, there 
then exists the risk to the primary producer’s reputation, which can cause the value-added 
purchaser to no longer buy their product. This purchaser can then tell other customers of this 
firm about the fraud and risk their future business operations. This increases the reputational 
risk and cost. When this is combined with the high chance of being caught, this makes 
mislabelling much less appealing and makes the first production point to value-added 
transactions an unlikely point for large scale mislabelling. 
Where, 
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𝑄 is constant for CL and ML, large figure 
𝑅 is relatively substantial 
b is near 1 
𝐹 is high 
Predicted outcome, 
P#$
(")* > 𝐸P-$(")* 
5.6 Value Add to Retail 
According to the variables inputted to the model at this stage, I argue this is where 
mislabelling is most incentivized. At this stage of the supply chain there exists a logic for the 
firm to mislabel, where, for any quantity there is almost no risks or costs associated with 
mislabelling, allowing firms to capture the entire difference in price between the correctly 
labeled and mislabelled products. That is because the likelihood of being caught mislabelling 
b is near zero. Thus far, no importers of processed seafood, domestic processors or any other 
value-added businesses have been prosecuted in Canada for mislabelling. This has been 
allowed to occur while various experts and pieces of literature citing processed seafood as 
having the greatest rates of mislabelling exist. The cost of being caught, or F value, at this 
stage is high (as seen from the one case of Mucci Farms), but largely irrelevant because with 
the chance of being caught (b is extremely low, meaning there is little concern about the 
value of the fine or the cost of reputational damage. Also, although the fine, or other costs of 
being caught, is seemingly a large number, in relative terms to the size of these businesses 
and the size of profits they have been able to make without being caught thus far, the real 
value may be low, depending on the firm. This is tough to estimate, but since the risk of 
being caught is currently as low as it is, the other information is large irrelevant as the 
incentive to mislabel is high in any case. At this stage, reputational risk is nearly eliminated 
as well, though if they were to be caught the value would be high. 
In the previous stage of the supply chain, a firm that is caught mislabelling, the reputational 
and financial values matter a substantial amount. At this stage of the supply chain, the values 
are nearly the same, but they are insignificant due to the lack of risk in being caught 
mislabelling. The reason for the low risk is the inability to identify products that have been 
processed or value-added as mislabelled. Below is an image that Oceana produced that 
shows how low-value products that have been processed can be sold as high-value similar 
looking products.  
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Figure 4.1: Showing difficulties in processed seafood identification (Oceana, 2011) 
For context, the top left of the Atlantic cod section is Escolar, the previously mentioned 
seafood product that can cause adverse health effects. In the second frame, the photo on the 
left is a Nile perch fillet, which is a fresh water fish being misidentified as a saltwater based 
grouper. Finally, in the middle picture the left of the photo is swordfish, while on the right is 
Mako Shark, a threatened species (Oceana, 2011). This is only a small sampling but shows the 
challenges that purchasers face when buying value-added seafood, and how easy it is for 
processors to act fraudulently. 
These findings are the first step in identifying the major incentives that have pushed seafood 
mislabelling issues to the extreme levels they are at in Canada. The expected profits from 
mislabelling and real profits from correctly labeled fish can differ vastly, for example, the Nile 
perch fillet is less than half the value of grouper in a retail (Oceana, 2011). In many cases the 
increase in profits from mislabelling can be in the hundreds of percent range. Someone must 
pay for this fraudulent profit and that is the average consumer, a price conscious person, who 
could be living hand to mouth. Canada is lucky enough to have a population that is well off, 
however, in 2011 the average Canadian home earned 80,940 CAD, before taxes, and spent 
8,629 CAD of their after-tax income on food alone (Statistics Canada, 2015). That means that 
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Canadians are spending over 10% of their income on food; 40% of these food expenditures 
are on protein and restaurant foods4, and with seafood accounting for some portion of this, 
there is justification for concern. This is costing the Canadian consumers substantial amounts 
of money on fraudulent products, and as the consumption of seafood grows, as does this cost. 
The implications of this are far reaching, but at the very least it is damaging to consumer trust 
and to the actors in the seafood industry that do not take part in fraud. 
This finding begins to shed light into the black box that is the seafood supply chain. There 
does exist one more stage which can also have implications on mislabelling. However, this 
stage of the supply chain has the greatest amount of product in terms of value passing through 
it. This stage of the supply chain, in terms of value, is greater than domestic marine fisheries, 
freshwater fisheries and aquaculture in Canada, combined (Fisheries and Oceans, 2008). 
Processed seafood products are imported, exported and sold domestically. With the knowledge 
that this stage of the supply chain is the crux of this issue, there becomes a foundation for 
government to increase the oversight of this stage, to increase the punishment, which, through 
publicity, will increase the reputational risk. If this occurs for one business and the cost 
implications are great enough, there is likely a spillover effect that may yield results across all 
seafood processing and importing businesses operating in Canada. 
Overall, in terms of size and incentive, this stage has the greatest influence thus far to 
mislabelled seafood. The cost of this fraud cannot be easily determined, yet clearly the 
magnitude is immense. This is fraud on a scale rarely seen and, has yet to be punished. 
Where, 
𝑄 is constant for CL and ML, large figure 
𝑅 is substantial 
b is near 0 
𝐹 is high in nominal terms, may be low in real 
Predicted outcome, 
𝐸P-$(")* > P#$(")* 
                                                
4 Calculated from figures provided at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/famil132a-eng.htm 
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5.7 Retail to Consumers 
This stage of the supply chain presents the most challenging analysis. Retailers include 
restaurants, grocery stores and fishers or distributors (with validated product in developed 
countries) selling to consumers. This is an extremely broad category and is challenging to 
group such into one segment. At this stage of the supply chain there is a small incentive to 
mislabel. The reasons for this depend on the situation of the firm, the price from selling the 
mislabelled product and the reputational risk. 
At this stage of the supply chain there is a relative-to-size reputational risk for all parties. 
Consumers would avoid a retail location if seen as fraudulent. However, when you take 
restaurants of various sizes that can vary. For example, a small sushi restaurant that gets caught 
is unlikely to face large reputational backlash, but if a large restaurant chain, like McDonalds 
is caught, the costs would be much greater. This is the same with retail locations like grocery 
stores or delis, if a small actor is caught, the reputational risk is minimal, but if a chain of 
grocery stores, or worse, a grocery chain like Whole Foods, which prides itself on quality and 
organic products, is caught, this could potentially destroy their business. The factors that affect 
this are many including the size of the business, the business model (are they the low-cost 
option? Do they highlight their sustainability and traceability of products? How large is their 
exposure risk?) and the scale of the issue (is one product mislabelled or are many?).  
Beyond reputational risk, the next major factor is the risk of being caught. This is again 
dependent. Restaurants face intense scrutiny by local health authorities and must face 
sanitation audits and product inspections; however, these inspections do not include genetic 
testing of seafood. That makes restaurants unlikely to be caught mislabelling; however, if 
consumers become sick from their products (such as mislabelled Escolar being sold as Tuna 
and causing gastrointestinal issues) the business does face a cost and risk. As for grocery and 
retail stores, they face some audits and are under pressure by NGOs and the public to be 
transparent. With pushes for labels like Fair Trade, MSC and others. These businesses are 
under public scrutiny to improve traceability and sustainability, but not much oversight is 
given to mislabelling by the governing bodies. The local health authorities do not have the 
resources or ability to test seafood products at this stage; however, this is being done by others. 
Groups like Oceana, CBC Marketplace and SeaChoice have undertaken testing of retail 
products and restaurant offerings, and found mislabelling (Oceana, 2017). Although the 
 37 
mislabelling was discovered in almost half of the samples, the businesses have not been 
publically named. Thus, there exists the means to catch mislabelling businesses, or possibly, 
catch the processors that supply them with mislabelled product. That being said, the 
organizations have not made the names public and thus the risk of them bring caught is low. 
That is because, to have a high catch rate at this stage relies on these groups releasing 
information on where the mislabelled product was found. The only current information they 
have made public is listed below. 
 
Figure 4.2: Oceana Mislabelling Rates in Retail locations in North America (Oceana 2012) 
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Figure 4.3: CBC Marketplace finding 41% of retail samples were mislabelled, with only 7 of 
120 Red Snapper samples being correct and 84% of white Tuna being mislabelled (Huang 
2013) 
To correctly address these issues, there must be a greater push for testing by government or 
more oversight. This is currently not the case and until it is, there is the risk that at this stage 
mislabelling will occur, but, thankfully, NGOs are keeping the businesses honest. The work 
of these NGOs (testing products and publishing results) should discourage mass level 
intentional mislabelling by firms at this stage; however, there exists the issue of these 
retailers selling product that is already mislabelled and being wrongly accused. As shown by 
the values used in the model, the previous stage of the supply chain has the greatest incentive 
to mislabelled, and if they are selling fraudulent product to these retailers, when they are 
caught mislabelling, the blame may be falsely placed on them, with no way to distinguish if 
they are intentionally or unintentionally mislabelling. This complicates the potential 
solutions further. 
The final stage here is the price incentive. Selling low value products as much higher value 
products increases the expected profit and incentivizes the increase of mislabelling; however, 
this is not often the case in retail locations or grocery stores, where prices are set at market 
value, which limits how high they can go. Restaurants have a greater incentive here, as they 
can turn a low value product into a much greater value product, increasing their margins. This 
can occur because it is easier to disguise a low value product as a high value product in a 
restaurant dish, than a whole product sold in a store. Nonetheless, relying on the market is not 
enough on its own to prevent mislabelling, as the other factors (such as food regulation, 
oversight and NGO testing) are needed keep this in check. 
Overall, there is incentive at this stage to mislabelled, but it is not as great as the previous 
stage. Reputational risk is large and could shut down a business. The cost of being caught by 
the health authority or governing body could be great, but has not been explicitly set, yet the 
risk of being caught is low, but if the NGOs testing for fraud begin to expose which businesses 
have been tested, there would be less need for government to conduct testing and would serve 
to fulfil the value for oversight. With this information, the largest issue with identifying the 
incentive of mislabelling at this stage is the inability to tell if the retailers are the ones 
mislabelling or if a stage before them mislabelled. In the next sections this will be addressed, 
but the belief of the author on this matter is that concentrating on this stage is irrelevant. That 
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is because catching and punishing businesses that are sold fraudulent product and punishing 
them does not address the overarching issue. It is similar to illicit drugs, targeting individual 
small scale dealers is largely ineffective, while going after those who supply them is the end 
goal. This is the same with fraudulent seafood, using the governments limited resources to 
combat fraud for each small retailer is less effective than stopping mislabelled product from 
entering this stage of the supply chain. The focus must be on the greatest incentivized actors, 
and therefore should be a top down approach, beginning with the value add and processing 
firms, before moving onto retail. 
𝑄 is constant for both CL and ML, small figure 
𝑅 can range from low to high 
b is low to medium 
F is relative to size, ranging from low to medium 
Predicted outcome, 
Negligibly 𝐸P-$(")* ≥ P#$(")*  
5.8 Implications for Governing Authority 
The findings from the values utilized at each stage of the supply chain in this model show the 
most likely stage of mislabelling and, equally importantly, which stages were not incentivized 
to mislabel or not. This gives a starting point to addressing solutions in Canada. Thus far, the 
efforts have been undertaken by NGOs, and have been focused on informing consumers of 
traceability of the supply chain and which products are sustainable. However, it will be shown 
in the next section that neither of these solve for mislabelling, instead, it theoretically helps 
correct labelling firms increase their profitability (without any substantiated return on 
investment information) without targeting the businesses that are mislabelling. 
It will also be shown that the actions of the governing body heavily dictate the success of 
managing mislabelling. Relying on the actions of NGOs does not sufficiently dissuade actors 
from mislabelling and that legislation and oversight must be utilized effectively, otherwise 
progress will be limited.  
The key finding from this model is that in domestic production of seafood, there is largely no 
reason to police the stages before processing or value-add. There is little incentive to cheat 
and even when there is, it is not to large enough scale to dedicate resources to. This means that 
efforts can be placed on the latter sections, with a focus on genetically identifying products 
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that leave or enter the 722 registered processing plants in Canada and head to retail 
(Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2016). To further prove this, it would be good to get an 
idea of how many genetic audits at this stage would need to occur to discourage these actors 
from mislabelling. However, that research does not yet exist and could build off this paper. 
For imported products, the genetic testing again can focus on processed seafood. As identified 
earlier in the paper CFIA can test products that visually seem to be mislabelled or 
compromised. This is extremely tough to prove on processed product and with the random 
audits they do for current products, adding in a genetic testing aspect on processed products 
could help address some of the problems. 
One opportunity to address fraud throughout the supply chain is improving labelling standards. 
Canada’s dated documentation in this area does not address the necessary information needed 
to prevent IUU fish from entering Canada and makes mislabelling much easier. 
In the following sections the current ways mislabelling is being combatted in Canada will be 
assessed, the success of the EUs response to their seafood mislabelling issues will be reviewed 
and then policy options for Canada will be presented based upon the findings from this paper. 
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6. Current Solutions to Mislabelling in Canada 
6.1 What is currently being done? 
Canada has not combatted mislabelling via government actions, instead relying on NGOs and 
private enterprise thus far. Most of the work has been undertaken by groups like Oceana, 
SeaChoice, Marine Stewardship Council among others. I argue that, although these groups 
have done fantastic work, they do not offer a comprehensive solution to mislabelling. I do feel 
that they must be acknowledged and the role they play must be addressed. This section will 
highlight how ecolabelling is currently used, which actors contribute to it, what they do and 
the shortcomings of this system. Following this I will address the solutions that have been 
used in the European case and how they can be used, along with ecolabelling, to successfully 
combat mislabelling.  
6.2 Ecolabelling and Traceability 
A growing answer to mislabelling has been undertaken by various non-governmental groups 
which use labels and audits to follow supply chains of products and ensure they are 
environmentally and socially responsible. An ecolabel is a voluntary way of a business or 
product supplier to receive certification and labelling for the practices in the production and 
distribution of their product; moreover, an ecolabel identifies whether these products are 
environmentally and socially preferable to other options in the product or service category 
(Environment – EU, 2017). This system is widely visible in the consumer good market, with 
recognizable labels such as Fair Trade, Marine Stewardship Council and the EU Ecolabel. 
Ecolabelling allows consumers to choose a product, which has the same characteristics as the 
alternative yet is viewed as premium, due to the responsible way in which it is produced and 
traceability. Ecolabelled products rely on the audits conducted by the NGO or firm to prove 
the product is correctly labelled and scrutinized, therefore, helping to solve for mislabelling 
issues, and creating value for the firm and customer. Ecolabels allow consumers greater 
transparency and trust into a brand which choose to use this method. However, there are cost 
implications of this choice that must be covered. First, the ecolabelling and auditing costs must 
be borne, or split, by either the group undertaking the audits, the producers or the consumer, 
depending on the label and industry. Second, there must be a price premium to justify this 
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action, otherwise there exists no incentive to undertake this process. Finally, there must be a 
demand for this transparency, otherwise the premium put on a product would be above the 
consumers’ willingness to pay and would leave the product without a market. 
Ecolabelling has proven successful in various industries including coffee and organic 
agriculture. There are limitations however, ecolabelling is most successful in industries where 
consumers are ecologically conscious, which implies a willingness to pay the premium. Price 
conscious consumers are unable to afford the premium on the product (Schumacher, 2010). 
The findings showed that an ecolabel acts as a tax on good and the willingness to pay depends 
on the preferences and income of the consumers (Schumacher, 2010). These are consistent 
with traditional economic theory where consumers with higher disposable income are able to 
purchase premium products, but those without must settle for the lower cost option. Applying 
this information to seafood, ecolabelling is a partial solution to the supply chain issues in 
seafood, however, it cannot fully solve for all products in the market. 
A second major issue is that ecolabelling is a voluntary way of a business highlighting their 
supply chain transparency. This implies that the businesses that choose to undertake this 
process are confident in the origin and integrity of the supply chain of their product. Since the 
businesses and consumers split the cost of implementation, there is an incentive for business 
to use this as a potential value capture opportunity. In doing this, there is an incentive to 
correctly label, as shown below. 
Firm level, 
𝐸P-$(")* = − b ∗ 𝐹 + 𝑅 + [ 1 − b ∗ 𝑄"-$ ∗ 𝑃#$ + 𝐸𝑃-$ ] 
P#$
(")* = 𝑄"#$ ∗ 𝑃#$ 
P:$
(")* = (𝑄"#$ ∗ (𝑃#$*[1+EL]) 
 
Where, 
𝐸P-$(")* = Profit from mislabelling 
P#$
(")* = Profit from correct labeling 
𝑄 = Quantity of product, >0 
𝑅 = Reputational risk or loss of goodwill associated with being caught mislabelling 
𝑃 = Constant marginal profit per unit of product net of all relevant costs, > 0; and such that 
the expected profit per unit of mislabelling (𝐸𝑃-$) is >= the profit per unit of correctly 
labeled products (𝑃#$); 𝐸𝑃-$ >=0 
b = Perceived probability of being caught mislabelling 
𝐹 = Cost of being caught such as fine or loss of business 
i; 1…I represents the individual firms in the market 
EL = Percentage increase in profitability from Ecolabelling 
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In this case, ecolabelling is only contingent on the potential profitability increase of value 
gained from ecolabelling a correctly labelled product. There is no incentive for a firm that is 
mislabelling to use an ecolabel as they would first, must pay into it, decreasing the EP per unit, 
and second, would be paying into something that catches their mislabelling (which creates the 
value of EP+P>P); therefore, not only would this business be losing potential profit from od 
nad paying into the ecolabel, but they would be catching themselves acting fraudulently. This 
makes the chance of being caught 100%, causing damage to the firm’s reputation and drives 
EP below P. Overall, it shows that mislabelling is only effective for businesses that are 
correctly labelling their product and does nothing to address for businesses that are incorrectly 
labelling. 
These labels, then, are a tool for creating competitive advantage for firms, not a solution to 
addressing underlying issues. They can be used to prove which businesses do correctly label, 
but cannot prove that the businesses that do not use ecolabels are necessarily mislabelling. 
Therefore, this allows correct labelling firms to distinguish themselves, but cannot prove that 
firms that do not buy in are mislabelling. 
Other solutions ecolabelling groups have proposed involve informing consumers on which 
products to purchase. Oceana came up with the chart featured below on how consumers should 
purchase products to ensure they do not get sold mislabelled products: 
Ways to Protect Yourself When Buying Fish 
Buy a whole fish It’s harder to misrepresent a whole fish than a fillet. 
Know the fish you eat When purchasing fish, ask what species it is, where and 
how it was caught and if it is sustainable. This can trigger a 
chain reaction extending back to the seafood supplier. 
Be wary of fish that seems 
cheaper than it should be 
If it is too good to be true, it probably is. 
Learn about the seasonality 
of your favourite seafood 
products 
Products sold out of season are more likely to be fraudulent 
Figure 5.1: Adapted Oceana’s suggestions to consumers on which seafood products to buy to 
limit risk to mislabelling (Oceana, 2017) 
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According to an interview with Xiaonan Lu, a UBC professor of food science and expert on 
the matter, he suggests that consumers buy seafood that is in season, as this helps ensure it is 
less likely to be fraudulent (Dimoff, 2018). However, neither of the above cases does anything 
to address the issue, instead they offer ways of avoiding product that may be mislabelled. 
There is no actual change that prevents mislabelling, but an attempt to shift consumers 
purchasing power away from products that can be mislabelled. Yet, as identified by 
Schumacher, this only works for consumers that can afford these higher value products and 
are willing to pay for them. This solution does not address a substantial portion of consumers, 
leaving a lot to be desired. It does present an opportunity for government, health authorities 
and CFIA to create legislation to encourage chance. 
6.3 Lifescanner and Labelling Change 
SeaChoice has taken a further step and informed consumers on various rates of mislabelling 
in retail locations. They broke down the locations into groups, including poor labelling, 
unsatisfactory labelling, okay labelling and good labelling (Lifescanner 2018). These are 
based off the standards used in Europe, which include commercial designation and scientific 
name, harvest method (aquaculture or wild and what gear type was used), catch area, 
processing country (if processed) and others (European Commission, 2014). These standards 
are much more stringent than CFIA’s current labelling requirements and ensures that 
traceability is maintained for all products. Shown below is a contrasting of the various 
requirements from the European Union, United States and Canada 
 45 
 
Figure 5.2: SeaChoice report card on Seafood Labelling (Roebuck et al. 2017) 
Since this report, SeaChoice has been working with the University of Guelph on a project 
called Lifescanner. It allows consumers to take samples of seafood and send them in for 
testing. The hope being that this will force CFIA to increase their standards, which as seen 
from the above image have not changed since 1985, while the EU updated their policy in 
2014 and the United States in 2016 (Roebuck et al., 2017). 
The push for improved labelling standards has been forwarded by Oceana, CBC and many 
other sources; however, these groups are not currently willing to name the businesses they 
caught mislabelling. This allows these fraudulent actors to remain hidden and continue to 
take advantage of consumers. To solve for this, a more thorough analysis of how Europe 
utilized the data from academics to guide policy and generate results will be needed to 
convince the NGOs and firms to share the fraudulent firm’s identities. 
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7. European Case 
7.1 European Standards 
Europe has enacted the most stringent regulations on food labelling practices, these span all 
products, including seafood. They have done this to protect their consumers from adverse 
health effects, from allowing illegal or unethical products to enter the European market and to 
prevent consumers from being subject to fraud, costing money and losing consumer trust. This 
has proved immensely effective seafood, with some mislabelling rates being the lowest in the 
developed world, single digit percentages in many of the EU countries versus high double 
digit figures in North America (Mariani et al., 2015; Naaum and Hanner, 2015). This was not 
always the case, before the change in regulation, rates were much close to North America at 
25% (Miller and Mariani, 2010). This drove political changes to ensure that product labelling 
was made more comprehensive, which created a market where mislabelled seafood was much 
more difficult to import or process and therefore, harder for consumers to purchase. 
The proactive change led to substantial fraud decreases, as the new regulations, which included 
harvest method, area of harvest, country of processing, and correct names, were enacted. In a 
sense, the European union removed the necessity of third party traceability programs because 
the labelling standards required the product to be traced throughout naturally. Moreover, the 
European Union began to take food fraud seriously, they ensured that the regulations were 
upheld by including the administrative branches of government, judiciary and police and 
customs in the process. This ensured that regulation was upheld and punishments levied if 
fraud was identified (European Commission – Food, 2013).  
28 EU countries, plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, formed the European Commission 
on General Food Law with the stated goal of cooperating and upholding food chain law with 
cross-border impact (European Commission – Food, 2013). They chose to not set exact 
punishments, but instead deal with issues on a case by case basis and levy punishments as fir 
for each instance. This created a system where unscrupulous, large scale fraud is not punished 
the same as small scale accidental fraud. Moreover, it ensures that if an actor is caught, their 
punishments are made public, increasing the reputational risk this business faces in the future. 
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An example of the success of the European system can be seen in the case of Vietnamese 
seafood imports from 2016 when the Ministry of Agriculture and Development chose to 
disallow the licensing of Vietnamese seafood shipments to Europe (European Commission – 
Food, 2016). The commission prevented European business from importing products from this 
country and made this punishable by up to 20 years in prison; 15 countries agreed to this and 
the Vietnamese government was warned to act and stop fraudulently deceiving European 
customers (European Commission – Food, 2016). This does two things, the first being it 
ensures that the importers who either, intentionally or unintentionally, distributes this product 
are forced to act and second, the suppliers are brought to justice if their actions continue. It 
also creates a precedent for future businesses or states that look to act in this way, the bar is 
set, punishments are created and there is no ambiguity.  
The European Union has also created centers for research into food fraud. In 2018, the 
European Union launched the Knowledge Centre, which responds to consumer concerns on 
food quality and fraudulent practices (European Commission, 2018). The underlying belief in 
Europe is that, “Concerns about food fraud and food quality undermine consumer confidence 
and damage the whole supply chain in Europe, from farmers to retailers.” (European 
Commission, 2018). This approach punishes all parties that are taking part in fraud, making 
them understand that they are accountable for their actions and, then market factors can dictate 
the best solution to food fraud.  
How this affects the model is that both the rick of being caught and cost of being caught are 
known and are high; moreover, the risk to the reputation, by the sharing of information to the 
public of actors caught acting fraudulently, is substantial. This creates accountability, visible 
punishments and an incentive to not act fraudulently. This makes the ecolabelling system an 
option to increase value, but not a necessary factor. It also prevents unscrupulous actors from 
remaining in this market, and pushes the risk all the way down the supply chain, by closing 
markets for producers that choose to act fraudulently.  
The European commission acts to limit or prevent IUU fish from entering the market. By 
ensuring that labeling standards are strict, punishments for not abiding are large enough and 
oversight is thorough, there is little way for IUU to enter the market. IUU product relies on a 
lack of transparency, high value from cheating and weak labelling to enter markets. Thus, the 
European labelling standards address these major areas and make IUU product a much less 
viable option. This has massive implications for the IUU industry as a whole; the actors 
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supplying this good must then either change their actions by finding a new market for their 
product or becoming legitimate. If they do not, they cannot sell to their previous market and 
lose revenue. Moreover, they could be subject to large punishments by either their own 
government or international governing bodies, as the product is easily traced back to the origin. 
7.2 Challenges 
This European system does not come without challenges, with the most obvious being 
immense cost in oversight and policing. Not only does this require the governing body to take 
part in audits and understand where a product comes from and how it arrived, but it also 
requires significant input from the various branches of government and other international 
governments. The European government system is split into various sectors and implementing 
a system with the depth and breadth of the one used on food labeling practices requires many 
of these branches, including the legislative and judiciary. To push through legislation of this 
nature takes time, money and public support. Also, to create punishments that the judiciary 
can enforce requires one of two major things, a precedent to justify the punishment, or a 
guideline to determine what a fair punishment is. Since there existed nothing like this before, 
the EU had to use the latter. Therefore, there was substantial time and effort used to determine 
what kind of punishments should be levied, on who and how to enforce them. 
These kinds of challenges would be faced by any country following the EU’s model; however, 
the countries implementing the changes would be able to use the EU as a first-mover example. 
There is however, the issue of how to initiate this change. The EU acted due to a scandal that 
garnered huge media attention: Horse meat was fraudulently being sold as beef. This happened 
in 2013 and sent ripples through the EU after being identified in the UK (BBC News, 2013). 
This drove genetic testing of numerous products and spawned the changes in regulation and 
oversight. The issue with this is that it took a reactive response to change these rules rather 
than a proactive one. To create this change in other countries, it is likely (based upon this case) 
that the other countries would also be waiting for a reactive moment rather than a proactive 
change. 
The final and most challenging aspect of taking the EU’s response and applying it to other 
countries is the nature of the EU. The EU is recognized as being a very centre left system of 
governments of that the overall continent has a very liberal democratic perspective. This kind 
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of system does not exist in all liberal democracies, where there can be more conservative 
values. In these systems, conservative economises argue that oversight of the food system 
should be done by the market and that impinging on the rights of businesses in the capitalist 
system is government overstepping. This is most prominently seen in the United States where 
a system for tracking the country of origin in products (known as Country-of-Origin-Labelling 
or COOL) was becoming mandatory during President George W. Bush’s second term 
(Thompson, Sylvia & Morrissey, 2006). However, on January 17, 2004 President Bush signed 
public law 108-199, an exception to mandatory COOL labelling for wild and farmed seafood 
and shellfish products, due to large backlash from industry (Thompson, Sylvia & Morrissey, 
2006). These industry players argued that the cost of implementation (estimated at 3.9 billion 
USD) was too great and that the Bio-Terrorism Act requires certain traceability related 
information already, making COOL unnecessary (Thompson, Sylvia & Morrissey, 2006). This 
argument held up and Bush signed the document delaying the decision. This delay was 
expected to be dealt with in 2005; however, it was not until December of 2016 when a response 
to this issue was dealt with (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016). This 
ruling implemented stronger traceability measures, including country of origin; however, this 
was due to market pressure against the allowance of IUU fish into the country and took over 
ten years to be implemented. For a country like Canada that would sit in the middle of these 
two countries in terms of the political spectrum, what kind of reactive measure it would take 
to cause a change cannot be estimated; however, it can be noted that there should be some 
form of response as countries with very different political agendas, with many sitting on either 
side of the political spectrum, have been able to address this issue. 
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8. Policy Options for Canada 
8.1 Where Canada is Now 
This has been touched on many times throughout the paper and will be briefly summarized 
here. Canada is a laggard, our two closest allies and most similar nations (Europe and the 
United States) have both started to, or largely, addressed seafood fraud issues. Canada has not 
progressed labelling or fraud legislation since the 1980’s, even with public understanding and 
dissatisfaction on the issue growing. It has reached a point where Canadians are taking kits 
from NGOs to test the products they are buying to ensure it is not fraudulent; something that 
consumers should be able to rely on the government for (Roebuck et al., 2017). This section 
will offer some suggestions on what the Canadian government can do to help transparency 
become a greater norm in the seafood supply chain and address the epidemic of fraud in this 
sector. The proposed solutions should help with both domestic production and imported 
products. The costs of these solutions will be borne by government, industry and the 
population; however, the actual market price of products should not largely increase, rather 
the distribution of costs should be distributed more accurately than the current system. 
8.2 Find Justification 
Canada needs to find a means to spend a significant amount of time and money redressing 
their seafood, and food in general, regulation. The starting point must be the Consumer 
Packaging and Labelling Act of 1985, this sets out all the rules and regulations that guide 
packing information and what must be disclosed by business (Justice Laws – Government of 
Canada, 1985). The updating of this legislation should follow the actions of both the United 
States and Europe, where information on whether the product is farmed or wild the country of 
origin are minimum requirements. Canada should, still, be pushing the standards even farther, 
to match the European regulations. That would require both scientific and common name, 
harvest type (farmed or wild), harvest method for wild products, country of origin, FAO 
harvest area and countries of processing (European Commission – Food, 2018). This would 
largely diminish the need for large scale genetic testing of product and would be a solution 
that puts Canada on parity with leaders in this area. Moreover, it creates a precedent for the 
United States to do the same, which puts even greater pressure on those who are mislabelling 
to discontinue their actions as three large markets would no longer be accessible.  
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Finding justification for genetic testing comes from analyzing the consumer losses on 
fraudulent seafood, which as stated easier, look to be immense. In a recent interview with CBC 
the National Sylvain Charlebois, Dalhousie professor of food distribution and policy, fish 
fraud is immensely lucrative, comparable to the value of illicit street drugs (CBC, 2018). 
Though this income is not technically lost, as it transfers from consumers to fraudulent actors, 
creating a precedent for government. Furthermore, the saving in expenditures on fraudulent 
seafood, the restitution payments that will be required from fraudulent businesses to their 
consumers and the fine revenue to government should serve to cover a portion of the future 
genetic testing costs. 
Finally, if Canada increases their regulation on labelling, genetic testing and creates a system 
to punish those who are caught acting fraudulently, they will not be alone. Europe did this and 
created a model which Canada can use as the guideline to create an adapted system that works 
for the country. The United States has taken the first steps and by working on a similar 
schedule Canada and the United States can create monumental progress and share in the costs 
of the shift and knowledge share. There is no reason for Canada to reinvent the wheel, Europe 
created a successful system, now adaptation and fine tuning are all that is required to ensure 
the success Europe sought attained is available to Canada 
8.3 Strengthen Label Standards 
As listed in the previous section Canada must make changes to labeling. By changing the 
legislation that guides the labelling requirements of food, Canada will limit what products can 
be imported in the short term (while they change labels to meet the new standard) and will 
require adaptation from domestic business; however, many businesses already do this for 
Europe and the pains will be short lived. This has been pushed for by SeaChoice, a group 
supported by the David Suzuki Foundation. More recently, the FAO published a report on 
seafood fraud and stated a few main concepts that were needed to combat this issue, with 
mandatory labelling requirements being one of the main answers. They stated that seafood 
labels must be mandatory, with correct information, and must include the below information 




Figure 7.1: FAO Labelling Guidelines for Combatting Global Seafood Fraud (Food and 
Agriculture Organization 2018) 
These are copied from the European standard and set guidelines that are relatively simple to 
abide by, while requiring enough information that fraud becomes more difficult. When 
coupled with the other policy suggestions, fraud becomes extremely challenging. 
Correct labelling practices makes an intricate system simpler. Instead of having various 
labelling requirements and levels of scrutiny in oversight, there becomes a standard that 
businesses will be forced to abide by. This new standard, forces business to adhere to the 
legislation, leaving no option but to include more information on labels. Businesses will be 
faced with increased cost as they adapt, but when it is a standard, they have no other option. 
It also solves the issue for both aquaculture and wild caught products; labelling requirements 
are the same for both industries, leaving no grounds to argue unfair support of either industry.  
Implementing this change is the necessary first step in solving for fraud, and currently presents 
the greatest return on investment. This solution is cheap, shown to be effective and requires 
little more than legislative amendment for government. Any of the other policy suggestions 
require implementation of a new system or oversight; this however, requires very little. The 
FAO has pushed this idea on a global level and it is not a radical change.  
Canada tries to lead in many areas of the world in social programs, economic redistribution 
and environmental care, but when it comes to seafood and fraud it lags. Canada came through 
the most recent financial crisis due to strong oversight by the Canadian government in the 
banking sector, which went on to be praised by many governments and parties around the 
globe (Bordo, Reddish and Rockoff, 2010). When it comes to food, on the other hand, Canada 
is behind their neighbours and has not made a major change in the last 30 years. 
This is not a policy suggestion, instead this is a statement to government that this change must 
be made. Canada cannot advertise itself as a liberal democracy that is socially, economically 
and environmentally progressive, yet allows one of our largest industries, and one of the 
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world’s largest cases of fraud, to exist when there are meaningful solutions that are available. 
Labelling changes will be made, because they must be made. If they are not, Canada would be 
an embarrassment on the international stage with countries much less developed discussing 
this change before Canada. 
8.4 Genetic Testing 
To ensure that the labelling standards are upheld, Canada must undertake some genetic testing. 
These tests make sure that the species named on the label match the actual product. Hanner, 
the FAO and Europe all support genetic testing; however, the scale of this is debated. There 
could be the case made that all products should be genetically tested, but with a basic 
understanding of economics one knows that decreasing marginal returns would occur from 
this. Rather, there is some point between no testing and complete genetic testing where there 
is an optimal return on investment. I will not delve deeply into how much testing should occur 
as this requires substantial analysis, but some testing needs to occur. It can be undertaken as a 
differentiation strategy, using the increased revenue generated from increased willingness to 
pay by consumers, as was shown with ecolabelling, to offset some of the costs. I believe CFIA 
should be undertaking random testing on a frequent basis and not relying on the private sector 
to initiate this. 
This kind of testing does currently occur in small pockets, but is largely done by private 
companies at the retail stage, which is often too late. Rather, the testing should be undertaken 
when domestic product is processed then sold to then next stage of the supply chain. For 
imported product, it should be done when it is validated by CFIA. This keeps the supply chain 
honest, as shown in the model, and ensures that products need not be tested twice, increasing 
unnecessary costs.  
8.5 Levy Strong Punishments 
When trying to encourage positive change incentives, such as subsidies, can be offered to 
business or individuals. When trying to discourage illegal or detrimental actions, there must 
be punishments. If a punishment levied on mislabelling or fraud is minimal, then there is no 
incentive to stop (as seen by the model). The intention of this suggestion is to increase the cost 
of punishments for being caught acting fraudulently, particularly at the importer/processor 
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point. The rationale is, if the punishment value is sufficiently high then it can compensate for 
a lower oversight value. What this allows for is government to save money by not having to 
test as many products, but to see the similar results. That is because if one business witnesses 
the large cost on another business, for acting fraudulently, both their reputation and 
profitability take a hit. This, then, discourages other business from acting in such a way and 
forces the companies to start ensuring their supply chains are scrutinized, or else they risk their 
reputation and revenue.  
This occurred in the horsemeat scandal in Europe and has started to happen in Canada. 
Mentioned earlier was the case of Mucci Farms, which faced punishment for mislabelling 
product origins. The costs of their actions were borne by executives and the business, to the 
tune of around 2 million CAD (Buck, 2016). However, in more recent news, the Ontario 
Greenhouse Vegetable Growers has since levied an additional 3.2 million CAD fine against 
Mucci (Kuitenbrower, 2017). This brings the total cost up to around 5 million CAD, enough 
to discourage this kind of action again. The original punishment levied by CFIA, the 1.2 
million in fines, was over 10 times greater than their previous largest punishment 
(Kuitenbrower, 2017). This showed CFIA’s commitment to food fraud, and can be used as a 
guiding principle to apply similar punishments to seafood mislabelling. 
Though CFIA has showed it can levy fines and punishments that are discouraging it has not 
done enough clearly. A few major issues still exist. The first being that CFIA’s punishment 
was not the greatest. The Ontario union of vegetable growers nearly tripled the fine by the 
federal body which is supposed to prevent this type of fraud.  
Second, CFIA has only done this once, and never has done it in seafood. DNA authentication 
has proven to be viable, now it is CFIA’s responsibility to provide this service to the Canadian 
market. Once authentication has become the standard, a punishment to match the crime must 
be the next. With less than 1000 processors and importers of seafood in Canada generating 
billions of dollars in business, a small punishment will not suffice. A firm must be made 
example of; Tesco suffered substantially when they were found to be distributing horsemeat. 
Canadian fraudulent businesses need to suffer as well.  
Finally, the punishments and scrutiny cannot be directed at the small businesses at the end of 
the supply chain. As shown by the model, though these businesses do have some incentive to 
mislabel, the greatest incentive comes from the large, middle of the chain, processors and 
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importers. These businesses have the most to gain and the least to suffer within the current 
structure. Thus far, NGOs have placed their efforts on the end of the supply chain to show 
mislabelling is occurring. This paper has shown the incentive structure of the various parties, 
now government has a responsibility to act on the information presented to them and act 
accordingly. 
CFIA has all the tools and information needed to act, now the responsibility is on them to use 
it. However, they do not have to act alone, they have NGO support, many academics have 
shown an interest in addressing this issue, private businesses want this solved and most of all 
Canadian consumers need a solution.  
8.6 Work Together 
If CFIA were to go about this alone they would largely be ineffective and would see very little 
returns on investment for what they undertake. Instead, using Europe as a guideline, working 
with the United States as they change their policy and using their domestic resources, CFIA 
has a high probability of effectively combatting this issue. 
The basis of the paper was to show where mislabelling and fraud in the seafood supply chain 
happens, but it was also about applying the success of Europe in combatting it to Canada. 
Europe created programs to test seafood products, discourage actors from acting fraudulently 
and created strict standards on the information businesses need to provide. This system is not 
foolproof, but has thus far been the most progressive and effective. Canada has a great 
relationship with Europe and needs to use this to learn from what they did, but also to work 
together going forward. Instead of every country acting independently to research problems 
and develop solutions on their own, pooling resources and devising solutions together would 
serve to generate greater benefit for lower cost. This would also serve to create a more 
comprehensive solution when all countries adopt similar standards and share information, with 
the eventual goal of catalyzing a global shift in this direction. 
The second relationship Canada must leverage is the United States. Being neighbours, each 
other’s main trading partner and sharing many of the same issues, addressing this issue 
together will be fundamental to the success of it. The United States has made the initial move 
and Canada will have to do this. Once that occurs, Canada and the United States will be able 
to work through solutions that work well for both parties and hopefully countries beyond. 
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Most discussions between these two countries have been over trade balance issues. 
Collaborating on combatting seafood fraud is an opportunity to shift discussion from issue to 
benefit. Both parties would see gains in consumer confidence and the benefit serve to save 
consumers money, promote domestic jobs (through fisheries and aquaculture) and create an 
integrated food safety standard that is near, or equal to, the European standard. The benefits 
are obvious and there could be externalities that arise from this that serve to benefit other 
industries, or at the very minimum, quell tensions on current trade issues. 
Throughout this paper there has been a theme of parties acting independently to try and achieve 
a goal, while often overlooking an opportunity to work together. CFIA has been one of the 
largest perpetrators of this. Various NGOs and private enterprises have each pandered their 
own agenda rather than working together to create a comprehensive solution. Finally, many 
academics have highlighted the need for change, have generated the data to support it, yet have 
not collaborated with each other to force governing parties hand. This needs to end. 
Collaboration is the only way to solve this issue. Europe learned that the hard way and Canada 
needs to learn from this. 
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9. Conclusion 
Overall this paper has tried to distill a complicated matter into simple terms and offer some 
adequate solutions to the complex nature of seafood fraud. The initial section of this paper 
tried to convert the intricacies of the seafood supply chain into simple groups that 
distinguished the various stages in the process of ‘bait to plate’ seafood. Taking this 
information, the goal was to show that mislabelling was happening and that it was a systemic 
issue that had permeated all markets. Next, it was imperative to identify the issues of seafood 
fraud, which included consumer trust, money and health. In doing this, I showed that there did 
not currently exist an adequate solution to these issues in North America. Contrasting this, I 
presented Europe, which has solved most seafood fraud issues. This indicated that a potential 
solution exists and that North America could use this information to guide policy and deal 
with seafood fraud, but so far had failed to do so effectively. A model was built to show where 
this fraud was occurring and presented the most likely parties that were perpetuating it. 
Once this was distilled down to what it meant, the current solutions that existed in Canada 
were evaluated on their merits and where they fell short. Using Europe as a guideline, solutions 
and options for Canada were presented, offering suggestions on how to address this issue, 
where collaborations could occur and how to be most efficient and cost effective. 
There exists much more research to be done on the topic of seafood fraud and how to 
effectively combat it. The economic implications are derived without explicit data, they rely 
on supply chain understanding and logic. The true costs of this fraudulent actions are not 
understood and could be greater or smaller than implied by this paper. Economics is not the 
only sector that is at play in seafood fraud, politics (on a global scale), social implications, 
industrial sectors and various other external areas affected. Overall, there is much more to be 
done regarding this topic, but this paper begins to address the economic issues behind seafood 
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